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# CONCERNING A VOCABULARY FOR INQUIRY INTO KNOWLEDGE

UNDERTAKING (45.5)[1] to find a few firm names for use in connection with the theory of knowledge—hoping thereby to promote coöperation among inquirers and lessen their frequent misinterpretations of one another—we at once found it essential to safeguard ourselves by presenting in explicit postulation the main characteristics of our procedure (46.645).

The first aspect of this postulatory procedure to stress is that the firm namings sought are of that type of firmness attained by modern science when it aims at ever-increasing accuracy of specification rather than at exactness (q.v.) of formulation, rejecting thus the old verbal rigidities, and leaving the paths of inquiry freely open to progress.

An observation which, we believe, any one can make when the actual procedures of knowledge theorists are examined is that these procedures deal with knowings in terms of knowns, and with knowns in terms of knowings, and with neither to itself alone. The epistemologist often comments casually on this fact, and sometimes discusses it at length, but rarely makes any effort deliberately to act upon it. No attempt at all, so far as we are aware, has been made to concentrate upon it as a dependable base for operations. We accept this observation and report as sound, and we postulate accordingly.

Such a postulation, wherever the inquiry is not limited to some particular activity of the passing moment but is viewed broadly in its full scope, will at once bring into the knowing and the known as joint subject-matter all of their positings of "existence," inclusive of whatever under contrasting manners of approach might

[1] We shall refer to preceding papers in this JOURNAL by use of the figure 45 for Vol. XLII (1945), and by the figures 46 and 47 for the two succeeding volumes, in each case following the year number by the page number after a decimal point. The papers have appeared in Volume XLII (1945), pp. 5, 39, 225, and 645; Volume XLIII (1946), pp. 505, 533, and 645; Volume XLIV (1947), p. 281. See also "Logicians' Underlying Postulations" in *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 12 (1945), p. 3, and "The New 'Semiotic'" to appear in the September, 1947, issue of *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.

be presumed to be "reality" of action or of "being" underlying them. Taking this subject-matter of inquiry as one single system, the factual support for any theory of knowings is then found to lie within the spatial and temporal operations and conclusions of accredited science. The alternative to this—and the sole alternative—is to make the decision as to what is and what is not knowledge rest on evidence taken as available independent of and prior to these scientific subject-matters, but such a course is not for us.

Under this postulation we limit our immediate inquiry to knowings through namings, with the further postulation that the namings (as active behaviors of men) are themselves before us as the very knowings under examination. *If* the namings alone are *flatus vocis*, the named alone and apart from naming is *ens fatuum*.

The vague word "knowledge" (q.v.) in its scattered uses covers in an unorganized way much territory besides that of naming-knowing.[2] Especially to remark are the regions of perception-manipulation on the one hand, and the regions of mathematically symbolic knowledge on the other. These remain as recognized fields of specialized inquiry for the theory of knowledge. Whether or not the word "knowledge" is to be retained for all of these fields as well as for namings-knowings is not a question of much importance at the present imperfect stage of observation and report.

Some of the words here appraised may be taken as key-names for the postulation employed, and hence as touchstones for the other names. *Fact* is thus used for knowings-knowns in system in that particular range of knowings-knowns, namely, the namings-nameds, which is studied. *Designation* is used as a most general name for the naming phases of the process, and *Existence* as a most general name for the named phases. Attention is called to the distinction between *inter* and *trans* (the former the verbal locus of much serious contemporary confusion), and to the increasingly firm employment of the words "aspect" and "phase" within the transactional framework of inspection.

Certain changes are made from our earlier recommendations.[3]

[2] How much territory the word "knowledge" is made to cover may be seen from what is reported of it in Runes's *The Dictionary of Philosophy* (1942). Knowledge appears as: "Relations known. Apprehended truth. Opposite of opinion. Certain knowledge is more than opinion, less than truth. Theory of knowledge, or epistemology (which see), is the systematic investigation and exposition of the principles of the possibility of knowledge. In epistemology, the relation between object and subject."

[3] Compare especially the tentative list of words suggested at the close of our paper "A Terminology for Knowings and Knowns," Vol. XLIII (1945), pp. 225–247.

"Existence" replaces "event," since we have come to hope that it may now be safely used. "Event," then, replaces "occurrence." "Definition" has been demoted from its more general assignment, since continued studies of its uses in the present literature show it so confused as to rate no higher than a crude characterization (47.281). "Symbolization" has been given the duty of covering the territory which, it was earlier hoped, "definition" could cover. "Exact" for symbolization has been substituted for "precise," in correlation with "accurate" for specification. The names "behavior-object" and "behavior-agent" have been dropped, as not needed at the present stage of inquiry, where object and organism suffice.

The reader will understand that what is sought here is clarification rather than insistent recommendation of particular names; that even the most essential postulatory namings serve the purpose of "openers," rather than of "determiners"; and that if the distinctions herein made prove to be sound, then the names best to be used to mark them may be expected to adjust themselves in the course of time under attrition of the older verbal abuses.

ACCURATE. When specification is held separate from symbolization (q.v.), then separate adjectives to characterize degrees of achievement in the separate processes are desirable. Accurate is recommended in the case of specification. See *Exact*.

ACTION, ACTIVITY. These words are used by us in characterizations of durational-extensional subject-matters only. Where a stressed substantive use of them is made, careful specification should be given; otherwise they retain and promote vagueness.

ACTOR. A confused and confusing word; should never be used without the most careful specification under explicit postulation.

APPLICATION. The application of a name to an object may often be spoken of advantageously where other phrasings mislead. See *Reference*.

ASPECT. The components of a full transactional situation, being not independents, are aspects. The word is etymologically correct; the verb "aspect" is "to look out." See *Phase*.

BEHAVIOR. A behavior is always to be taken transactionally: i.e., never as *of* the organism alone any more than *of* the environment alone, but always as of the organic-environmental situation, with organisms and environmental objects taken as equally its aspects. Studies of these aspects in provisional separation are essential at many stages of inquiry, and are always legitimate when carried on under the transactional framework, and through an inquiry which is itself recognized as transactional.

BEHAVIORAL. Behavioral inquiry is that in which the processes examined are not currently explorable by physiological (q.v.) techniques. To be understood in freedom equally from behavioristic and from mentalistic allusions. Covers equally the ranges called "social" and those called "individual."

BIOLOGICAL. Inquiry in which organic life is the subject-matter, and in which the processes examined are not currently explorable by physical (q.v.) techniques.

CHARACTERIZATION. The intermediate stage of designation in the evolutionary scale, with cue (q.v.) preceding, and specification (q.v.) following (46.657); includes the greater part of the everyday use of words; reasonably adequate for the commoner practical purposes.

CIRCULARITY. Regarded as a radical defect by non-transactional procedures which undertake to organize "independents" as "reals." Normal for inquiry into knowings and knowns in system (45.238).

CONNECTION. To apply between objects under naming. See *Reference* and *Relation.*

COHERENCE. Suggests itself for connection (q.v.) as established under specification, in distinction from consistency attained in symbolic process.

CONCEPT, CONCEPTION. Conception has two opposed uses: on one side as a "mentalistic entity"; on the other as a current phrasing for subject-matters designed to be held under steady inspection in inquiry. Only the latter is legitimate under our form of postulation. In any event the hypostatization set up by the word "concept" is to be avoided; and this applies to its appearance in formal logic even more than anywhere else.

CONSCIOUSNESS. The word has disappeared from nearly all research, but survives under various disguises in knowledge theory. Where substantively used as something other than a synonym of a comparable word, "awareness," we can find under our postulation no value whatever in it, or in its disguises, or in the attitudes of inquiry it implies.

CONSISTENCY. To be used exclusively in symbolic ranges. See *Coherence.*

CONTEXT. A common word in recent decades carrying many suggestions of transactional treatment. However, where it obscures the issues of naming and the named, i.e., when it swings obscurely between verbal and physical environments, it is more apt to do harm than good.

COSMOS. Commonly presents "universe as system." If the speaking-knowing organism is included in the cosmos, and if in-

quiry proceeds on that basis, cosmos appears as an alternative name for fact (q.v.).

CUE. The earliest stage of designation in the evolutionary scale (46.655). Some recent psychological construction employs cue where the present study employs signal (46.657). Firm expression is needed in some agreed form. If a settled psychologist's use develops, then it, undoubtedly, should govern.

DEFINITION. Most commonly employed for specification (q.v.), though with varied accompanying suggestions of dictionary, syllogistic, or mathematical adaptation. These latter, taken in a group, provide a startling exhibit of epistemological chaos (47.281). In recent years a specialized technical application has been under development for the word in formal logic. Establishment in this last use seems desirable, but the confusion is now so great that it is here deemed essential to deprive the word of all terminological status above that of a characterization (q.v.) until a sufficiently large number of experts in the fields of its technical employment can establish and maintain a specific use.

DESIGNATION. The knowing-naming phase of fact (45.237; 46.653). To be viewed always transactionally as behavior. The word "name" (as a naming) (q.v.) may advantageously be substituted wherever one can safely expect to hold it to behavioral understanding. Extends over three levels: cue, characterization, and specification.

DESCRIPTION. Developed characterization building towards specification (46.659); accordingly, not to be unduly narrowed as is done when it is brought too sharply into contrast with narration as temporal.

ENTITY. Assumed or implied physical, mental, or logical independence or semi-independence (the "semi" always vague or evasive) in some part of a subject-matter under inquiry; thus, a tricky word, even when not positively harmful, which should be rejected in all serious inquiry. See *Thing* which, in its idiomatic use, is free from the misleading pretentiousness of entity.

ENVIRONMENT. Situations, events, or objects in connection (q.v.) with organism as object. Subject to inquiry physically, physiologically, and, in full transactional treatment, behaviorally.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL. As far as this word directly or indirectly assumes separate knowers and knowns (inclusive of to-be-knowns) all epistemological words are ruled out under transactional procedure.

EVENT. That range of differentiation of the named which is better specified than situation, but less well specified than object. Most commonly employed with respect to durational transition.

(In earlier sketches employed (as 45.245) where we now employ existence.)

EXACT. The requirement for symbolic procedure as distinguished from the requirement of accuracy (q.v.) for specification.

EXCITATION. A word suggested for specific use where *physiological* process of environment and organism is concerned and where distinction from stimulus in its own specific uses (q.v.) is required.

EXISTENCE. The known-named phase of fact, transactionally inspected. Established through designation under an ever-increasing requirement of accuracy in specification. Not permitted entry as if at the same time both a "something known" and a "something else" underlying the known. Physical, physiological, and behavioral subject-matters are here taken as equally existential, however different the technical levels of their treatment in inquiry at a given time may be. Both etymologically and in practical daily uses this application of the word is far better justified than is an extra-behavioral or absolutist rendering (whether physicalist or mentalist) under some form of speculative linguistic manipulation.

EXPERIENCE. This word has two radically opposed uses in current discussion. These overlap and shift so as to cause continual confusion and unintentional misrepresentation. One stands for short extensive-durational process, an extreme form of which is identification of an isolated sensory event or "sensation" as an ultimate unit of inquiry. The other covers the entire spatially extensive, temporally durational application; and here it is a counterpart for the word "cosmos." The word "experience" should be dropped entirely from discussion unless held strictly to a single definite use: that, namely, of calling attention to the fact that *existence* has organism and environment as its aspects, and can not be identified with either as an independent isolate.

FACT. The cosmos in course of being known through naming by organisms, themselves among its phases. It is knowings-knowns, durationally and extensionally spread; not what is known to and named by any one organism in any passing moment, nor to any one organism in its lifetime. Fact is under way among organisms advancing in a cosmos, itself under advance as known. The word "fact," etymologically from *factum*, something done, with its temporal implications, is much better fitted for the broad use here suggested than for either of its extreme and less common, though more pretentious applications: on the one hand for an independent "real"; on the other for a "mentally" endorsed report.

FIELD. On physical analogies this word should have important application in behavioral inquiry. The physicist's uses, however, are still undergoing reconstructions, and the definite correspondence

needed for behavioral application can not be established. Too many current projects for the use of the word have been parasitic. Thorough transactional studies of behaviors on their own account are needed to establish behavioral field in its own right.

FIRM. As applied to a proposed terminology for knowings and knowns this word indicates the need of accuracy (q.v.) of specification, never that of exactness of symbolization. For the most firm, one is to take that which is least vague, and which at the same time is most free from assumed finality—where professed finality itself, perhaps, is the last word in vagueness.

IDEA, IDEAL. Underlying differences of employment are so many and wide that, where these words are used, it should be made clear whether they are used behaviorally or as names of presumed existences taken to be strictly mental.

INDIVIDUAL. Abandonment of this word and of all substitutes for it seems essential wherever a positive *general theory* is undertaken or planned. Minor specialized studies in terms of the individual should expressly name the limits of the application of the word, and beyond that should hold themselves firmly within such limits. The word "behavior" (q.v.) as presented in this vocabulary covers both individual and social (q.v.) on a transactional basis in which the distinction between them is aspectual.

INQUIRY. A strictly transactional name. It is an equivalent of knowing, but preferable as a name because of its freedom from "mentalistic" associations.

INTER. This prefix has two sets of applications (see Oxford Dictionary). One is for "between," "in-between," or "between the parts of." The other is for "mutually," "reciprocally." The result of this shifting use as it enters philosophy, logic, and psychology, no matter how inadvertent, is ambiguity and undependability. The habit easily establishes itself of mingling without clarification the two sets of implications. It is here proposed to eliminate ambiguity by confining the prefix *inter* to cases in which "in between" is dominant, and to employ the prefix *trans* where the mutual and reciprocal are intended.

INTERACTION. This word, because of its prefix, is undoubtedly the source of much of the more serious difficulty in discussion at the present time. Legitimate and illegitimate uses in various branches of inquiry have been discussed in preceding papers (46.505; 46.533). When transactional and interactional treatments come to be explicitly distinguished,[4] progress in construction should be more easily made. For the general theory of knowings

[4] Transactions: doings, proceedings, dealings. Interaction: reciprocal action or influence of persons or things on each other (Oxford Dictionary).

and knowns, the interactional approach is entirely rejected under our procedure.

KNOWLEDGE. In current employment this word is too wide and vague to be a *name* of anything in particular. The butterfly "knows" how to mate, presumably without learning; the dog "knows" its master through learning; man "knows" through learning how to do an immense number of things in the way of arts or abilities; he also "knows" physics, and "knows" mathematics; he knows *that* and he knows *what*. It requires only a moderate acquaintance with philosophical literature to observe that the vagueness and ambiguity of the word "knowledge" account for a large number of the traditional "problems" called *the problem of knowledge*. The issues that must be faced before firm use is gained are: Does the word "knowledge" indicate something the organism possesses or produces? Or does it indicate something the organism confronts or with which it comes into contact? Can either of these viewpoints be coherently maintained? If not, what change in preliminary description must be sought?

KNOWINGS. Organic phases of transactionally observed behaviors. Here considered in the familiar central range of namings-knowings. The correlated organic aspects of signalings and symbolings are in need of transactional systematization with respect to naming-knowings.

KNOWNS. Environmental phases of transactionally observed behaviors. In the case of naming-knowings the range of the knowns is that of existence within fact or cosmos, not in a limitation to the recognized affirmations of the moment, but in process of advance in long durations.

LANGUAGE. To be taken as behavior of men (with extensions such as the progress of factual inquiry may show to be advisable into the behaviors of other organisms). Not to be viewed as composed of word-bodies apart from meanings, nor as word-meanings apart from word-embodiment. As behavior, it is a region of knowings. Its terminological status with respect to symbolings or other expressive behaviors of men is open for future determination.

MANIPULATION. See *Perception-manipulation.*

MATTER, MATERIAL. See *Physical* and *Nature.* If the word "mental" is dropped, the word "material" (in the sense of matter as opposed to mind) falls out also.

MATHEMATICS. A behavior developing out of earlier linguistic activities, which, as it advances, more and more gains independence of namings and specializes on symboling. See *Symbol.*

MEANING. A word so confused that it is best never used at all. More direct expressions can always be found. (Try substituting,

for example, "is," or using "involves.") The transactional approach does away with that split between disembodied meanings and meaningless bodies for meanings which still enters flagrantly into much discussion.

MENTAL. This word not used by us. Usually indicates an hypostatization arising from a primitively imperfect view of behavior, and not safe until the splitting of existence into two independent isolates has been generally abandoned. Even in this latter case the word should be limited to service as emphasizing an aspect of existence. See *Behavior* and *Transaction.*

NAME, NAMING, NAMED. Language behavior in its central ranges. Itself a form of knowing. Here temporarily and technically replaced by the word "designation," because of the many traditional, speculatively evolved, applications of the word "name," closely corresponding to the difficulties with the word "concept" (q.v.), many of them still redolent of ancient magic. The word "name" will be preferred to the word "designation," as soon as its use can be considered free from probable hearers' distortions.

NATURE. See *Cosmos* and *Fact.* Here used to represent a single system of subject-matters of inquiry, without implication of predetermined authoritative value such as is usually intended when the word "natural*ism*" is used.

OBJECT. Within fact, and within its existential phase, object is that which acquires firmest specification, and is thus distinguished from situation and event. This holds to the determination of Dewey (*Logic,* p. 119; also pp. 129, 520, *et al.*) that in inquiry object "emerges as a definite constituent of a resolved situation, and is confirmed in the continuity of inquiry," and is "subject-matter, so far as it has been produced and ordered in settled form."

OBJECTIVE. A crude characterization which seems easily enough intelligible until one observes that in the behavioral sciences almost every investigator calls his own program objective, regardless of its differences from the many self-styled objective offerings that have gone before. As often employed the word has merely the import of impartial, which might advantageously replace it. Objective is used so frequently to characterize aspects of "subject" rather than of "object," that its own status with respect both to subject and to object should be carefully established before use.

OBSERVATION. To be taken as durationally and extensionally transactional, and thus neither separately in terms of the observing, nor separately in terms of the observed. Never to be treated as an act at a spot, nor in any other way as isolated or independent. See *Experience.*

OPERATIONAL. The word "operation" as applied to behavior in recent methodological discussions should be thoroughly overhauled and given the full transactional status that such words as "process" and "activity" (q.v.) require.

ORGANISM. Taken as transactionally existent in cosmos. Presentations of it in detachment or quasi-detachment are to be viewed as tentative or partial.

ORGANIZATION. See *System*.

PERCEPTION-MANIPULATION. Taken jointly and inseparably as the range of signal behaviors. Differences between perception and manipulation seemed striking in the earlier stages of the development of psychology, but today's specialization of inquiry should not lose sight of their common behavioral status.

PHASE. Aspect of fact in sufficiently developed statement to exhibit definite spatial and temporal localizations.

PHENOMENON. A word that still has possibilities of convenient use, if deprived of all of those implications commonly called subjective, and used for provisional identifications of situation with no presumptive "phenomenine" behind it for further reference.

PHYSICAL. One of the three at present outstanding divisions of the subject-matters of inquiry. Identifiable through technical methods of investigation and report, not purported differences in material or other forms of purported substance.

PHYSIOLOGICAL. That portion of biological inquiry which forms the second outstanding division of the subject-matter of all inquiry as at present in process; differentiated from the physical by the techniques of inquiry employed more significantly than by mention of its specialized organic locus. See *Behavioral*.

PRAGMATIC. This word is included here (but no other of its kind except epistemological) solely to permit a warning against its current degradation in making it stand for what is practical to a single organism in limited durational spread—this being a use remote from that of its origin.

PROCESS. To be used aspectually or phasally. See *Activity*.

PROPOSITION. Closely allied to proposal both etymologically and in practical daily use. Widely divorced from this, and greatly confused in its current appearances in the logics.[5] Many efforts in the last two decades to distinguish it clearly from assertion, statement, sentence, and other words of this type upon the basis of the older self-oriented logics, have only served to increase the difficulties. Sufficient light is thrown upon its status by its demand, concealed or open, that its component terms be independent fixities

[5] For some illustrations see Bentley, "Logicians' Underlying Postulations," *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 13 (1946), pp. 3–19.

while at the same time it hypostatizes itself into an ultimate fixity. Treated in Dewey's *Logic: the Theory of Inquiry* under radically different construction as an intermediate and instrumental stage in inquiry.

REAL. Its use to be completely avoided when not a recognized synonym for genuine as opposed to sham or counterfeit.

REALITY. As commonly used, it may rank as the most metaphysical of all words in the most obnoxious sense of metaphysics, since it is supposed to name something which lies underneath and behind all knowing, and yet, as Reality, something incapable of being known in fact and as fact.

REACTION. To be coupled with excitation in *physiological* reference (q.v.).

REFERENCE. Behavioral application of naming to named. See *Connection* and *Relation.*

RELATION. Various current uses, ranging from casual to ostentatious; rarely with any sustained effort at localization of the "named," as is shown by ever-recurrent discussions (and, what is worse, evasions) as to whether relation (assumed to have a certain existence somewhere as itself factual) is "internal" or "external." Suggested by us to name system among words, in correlation with reference and connection (q.v.). See Dewey, *Logic: the Theory of Inquiry,* p. 55, for such a presentation.

RESPONSE. To be coupled with stimulus in the signal range of behavior.

SCIENCE, SCIENTIFIC. Our use of this word is to designate the most advanced stage of specification of our times—the "best knowledge" by the tests of employment and indicated growth.

SELF. Open to aspectual examination under transactional construction. Where substantively stressed as itself an object, self should not be permitted also an aura of transactional values, tacitly, and apart from express development.[6]

SELF-ACTION. Used (46.509) to indicate various primitive treatments of the known, prior in historical development to interactional and transactional treatments. Rarely found today except in philosophical, logical, epistemological, and a few limited psychological regions of inquiry.

SENTENCE. No basic distinction of sentence from word nor of meaning of sentence from verbal embodiment of sentence remains when language is viewed as transactionally behavioral.

SIGN. This name applied transactionally to organic-environ-

[6] In illustration: Mead's wide-ranging transactional inquiries are still taken by most of his followers in the sense of interesting comments on an object in independence.

mental behavior. To be understood always as sign-process; never with localization of sign either in organism or in environment separately taken. Hence never as if signs were of two kinds: the natural and the artificial. Co-terminous with behavioral process, and thus technically characteristic of all behaviors viewed in their knowing-known aspects. Distinctive as technical mark of separation of behavioral from physiological process, with the disjointure of research in the present day on this borderline more marked than that on the borderline between physics and physiology, where biophysics is making strong advance. Evolutionary stages and contemporary levels differentiated into signal, name, and symbol.

SIGN-PROCESS. Synonym for *Sign*.

SIGNAL. The perceptive-manipulative level and stage of sign in transactional presentation. Border-regions between signaling and naming still imperfectly explored, and concise characterizations not yet available.

SITUATION. The more general, and less clearly specified, range of the named phase of fact. In our transactional development, the word is not used in the sense of environment; if so used, it should not be allowed to introduce transactional implications tacitly.

SOCIAL. The word in its current uses is defective for all *general* inquiry and theory. See *Individual*.

SPACE-TIME. Space and time alike to be taken transactionally and behaviorally—never as fixed or given frames (formal, absolute, or Newtonian) nor exclusively as physical specializations of the types known since relativity.[7]

SPECIFICATION. The most highly perfected naming behavior. Best exhibited in modern science. Requires freedom from the defectively realistic application of the form of syllogism commonly known as Aristotelian.

STIMULUS. An unclarified word, even for most of its key-word uses in psychology. The possibility of an adequate transactional specification for it will be a critical test of transactional construction.

SUBJECT. This word can profitably be dropped, so long as subjects are presented as in themselves objects. Subject was object in Greece and remains unclarified today. Might be properly used, perhaps, in the sense of "topic" as "subject-matter undergoing inquiry," in differentiation from "object" as "subject-matter determined by inquiry."

[7] See Bentley, "The Factual Space and Time of Behavior," this JOURNAL, Vol. XXXVIII (1941), pp. 477–485.

SUBJECTIVE. Even less dependable as a word than objective (q.v.).

SUBJECT-MATTER. Whatever is before inquiry where inquiry has the range of namings-named. The main divisions in present-day research are into physical, physiological, and behavioral.

SUBSTANCE. No word of this type has place in the present system of formulation. See *Entity*.

SYMBOL. An advance of sign beyond naming, accompanied by disappearance of specific reference (q.v.) such as naming develops.

SYSTEM. Perhaps a usable word where transactional inquiry is under way. Thus distinguished from organization which would represent interaction. "Full system" has occasionally been used to direct attention to deliberately comprehensive transactional procedure.

TERM. This word has today accurate use as a name only in mathematical formulation where, even permitting it several different applications, no confusion results. The phrase "in terms of" is often convenient and, simply used, is harmless. In the older syllogism term long retained a surface appearance of exactness (q.v.) which it lost when the language-existence issues involved became too prominent. For the most part in current writing it seems to be used loosely for "word carefully employed." It is, however, frequently entangled in the difficulties of concept (45.15; 45.24). Given sufficient agreement among workers, term could perhaps be safely used for the range of specification, and this without complications arising from its mathematical uses.

THING. Most generally used for anything named. This very generality makes it a much safer word to use in epistemological discussion than its more pretentious substitutes. See *Object, Entity, Substance*.

TIME. See *Space-time*.

TRANS. This prefix has the sense of beyond, but in much recent development it stands for across, from side to side, etc. To be stressed is the radical importance at the present time of a clear differentiation between trans and inter (q.v.).

TRANSACTION. The knowing-known taken as one process in cases in which in older discussions the knowings and knowns are separated and viewed as in interaction. The knowns and the named in their turn taken as phases of a common process in cases in which otherwise they have been viewed as separated components, allotted irregular degrees of independence, and examined in the form of interactions. See *Interaction*.

TRUE, TRUTH. These words lack accuracy in modern professedly technical uses, such that the closer they are examined, it

frequently happens, the more inaccurate they appear. "Warranted assertion" (Dewey) is one form of replacement. Confinement to "semantic" instances is helpful, so far as "semantic" itself gains accuracy of use. A subject-matter now in great need of empirical inquiry, with such inquiry apparently wholly futile under traditional approaches.

WORD. To be used without presumptive separation of its "meaning" as "mental" from its "embodiment" (air-waves, marks on paper, vocal utterances, etc.) as "physical"; in other words, to be taken always as behavioral transaction, and thus as a subject-matter examined whole as it comes, rather than in clumsily fractured bits.

Some of the above words, as we have said, are representatives of our postulation, while others are recommended more generally as aids to clarification. Contrasted with these are other words, shown to be confusedly used, among them some so debased that their ejection from all technical discourse is unqualifiedly urged. Such a variety of treatments is probably the best than can be expected in examining vocabularies as ambiguous as those that have been under attention. We are *seeking* the firm (q.v.), not trying to decree it.

Finally with respect to our postulations: first, that knowing-knowns are to be transactionally studied, and secondly, that namings are basic existential knowings, we repeat what has been said often enough before: We are as well aware as any opponent can be that naming-knowings lie within wider fields of behaviors variously—whether analogically or otherwise—styled knowings. The critical issue concerns existence-knowing (fact-knowing) taken as presumptively prior to or apart from naming-knowing. When so taken, what is the organization between, or the system of, the two ranges? Much more of an answer is needed than is given by cue-guidance or loose characterization. Specification becomes essential, and for this, in the complex case, explicit postulation is the need.

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## HUMAN MINDS AND PHYSICAL OBJECTS

THE following inquiry is to a large extent definitions. The reason is that I can not hope to prove anything to another person if I can not first make him know what I am talking about.

*Physical objects.* No definition of physical object is herein

stated except in so far as the expression "physical object" is restricted in its possible meanings by having to be consistent with this paragraph and with all of this inquiry. All sensations are physical objects; but all physical objects are not the familiar human sensations. A tree, which is a physical object, has spatial attributes; there is no good reason why I should refuse to say that my visual sensation when I look at the tree has spatial attributes. If I suppose that a tree and my visual sensation of the tree are two distinct objects, there seems to be no good reason why the sensation can not be a sort of map of and very much smaller than the tree. Ordinary maps are made so that distances on the ground can be computed approximately from linear measurements on the map; for example, one unit on the map might represent 62,500 units on the ground; I can not measure both a distance on the ground and also my visual sensation of the distance on the ground so that both measurements are expressed in terms of a common unit; however, by comparing our sensations of a distance on the ground with our sensations of a tapeline, we can measure the distance on the ground in terms of a unit on the tapeline; ordinary maps, the ground, and tapelines are physical objects. There is considerable evidence to show that the part of our bodies to which our sensations are connected by the shortest chains of causation is the cerebral cortex. If it be assumed that the most reasonable place in which to locate my sensations is the part of my body to which my sensations are connected by the shortest chains of causation, then all of my succession of sensations is inside of my cerebral cortex. This is possible because my visual sensation of a tree can be assumed to be very much smaller than the tree. Sensations and all other parts of a human mind should be regarded as a part of the human body, which is a physical object. I discovered independently in 1929 the theory of this paragraph; at that time, my knowledge outside the fields of mathematics, statistics, and actuarial science was very small. The hypothesis of this paragraph is herein stated very briefly with very little proof, because I do not wish merely to repeat proofs which other writers have given. For example, my hypothesis is to a large extent the same as the endocephalic hypothesis, which Mr. Williams wrote about in his article entitled "On Having Ideas in the Head."[1] Most of his arguments can be used to prove my hypothesis.

*Human minds.* The succession of my sensations is a part of my mind. Why is my mind more than these sensations? If I draw a figure which is a good approximation to the ideal right triangle

[1] This JOURNAL, Vol. XXIX (1932), pp. 617–631.

of geometry and if I look at the figure, part of the resulting visual sensation is an approximation to a right triangle; the hypotenuse of the sensation is opposite the right angle of the sensation; in other words, the hypotenuse is related to the right angle; therefore, a relation between two parts of a sensation may be a part of the sensation. However, the causes of my sensations are not my familiar sensations. Parts of memories are sensations, but human memories contain stuff which is not the familiar human sensations. If the sensations of a person have no relations to each other and to other objects except the relations which are made of the sensations of that person, most of the relations which sensations seem to have to each other and to other objects and which seem so valuable do not exist. Part of my definition of a human mind is the following statement: a human mind is part of the human body, but not all of the body is the mind. This statement is too vague to be a complete definition of a human mind, because the statement is very far from showing precisely what part of the body is the mind. The best endeavor to make the statement less vague results in some such list as the following: the parts of a human mind are sensations, perceptions, imaginations, memories, acts of reasoning, acts of consciousness, acts of attention, pains, pleasures, emotions, acts of will, sense organs, the motor nerves which discharge impulses from the brain into the voluntary muscles, and a large part of the brain.

It seems to me that some parts of the human mind have been so well discussed by other people that it is not necessary to discuss these parts. However, some parts have not been well defined and discussed.

Consciousness means literally knowing together. Consciousness in this inquiry is defined as follows: consciousness is the bringing together a part of a mind and another object in such a way that the part of the mind knows the other object. The other object may be another part of the mind, the whole mind, or an object which is entirely outside of the mind, etc. The other object may or may not exist. Consciousness has been defined by stating that it is awareness; this is not a good definition, because it does not define awareness; consciousness is a better word than awareness.

Although I may not be able to remember exactly his words, a Professor of English told me the following: "I attended a lecture given by Royce, and was not able to understand anything he said; I attended a lecture given by James, and a high school boy might have understood James." Although I have been interested at times in the writings of James since 1909, I have never been able to understand what he meant by sensation. James in his *Psy-*

*chology: Briefer Course* wrote that "It is impossible rigorously to define sensation." I doubt that anybody has ever defined sensation with more clearness than James. Some animals which are not human animals probably have minds which contain sensations, which are not human sensations. So far in this inquiry I have used the word "sensation" without showing whether I was talking about human sensations or other sensations. During all of this inquiry, when I use the word "sensation," I mean "human sensation," unless the distinction between human sensations and other sensations is clearly indicated. I do not pretend to know what other people have meant by sensation. It may be that a rigorous definition of the expression "human sensation" would be infinite in length; however, it seems to me that a laborious attempt rigorously to define human sensation is very important. Since I have not the ability to define rigorously sensations which are not human, only a definition of human sensations will be tried in this inquiry.

"Human sensation" is defined by being restricted in its possible meanings by having to be consistent with this paragraph and with all of this inquiry. I hope that the possible meanings of human sensation are restricted to such an extent that human sensation is rigorously defined. So far as I know, nobody has ever meant by the expression "human sensation" what I mean by this expression. My excuse for being odd is that this oddity is likely to make it less difficult rigorously to define human sensation. The following definition is not satisfactory for several reasons: sensation is the consciousness of the qualities of the objects (including the body) stimulating the sense organs. This definition does not make a distinction between human sensations and other sensations. The use of the word "consciousness" in the definition is unsatisfactory, because there have been disputes among philosophers regarding the nature of consciousness, and because a consciousness of a quality of an object is more complicated than what I mean by a sensation. Human sensations are always parts of human acts of consciousness; however, these acts contain metaphysical stuff which is not the familiar human sensations. Just a quality abstracted from the situation consciousness of quality suggests much more precisely what I mean by a sensation; it may be that what I mean by a sensation never exists except as a part of a larger whole; however, abstraction is frequently a very valuable aid to clearness. According to physics and chemistry, the objects which stimulate our sense organs are made of such things as electrons and protons. The physicist and the chemist talk about the whirl of electrons and protons, and they either do not talk or talk very little about the

qualities of physical objects. Why is it that the physicist and the chemist either do not talk or talk very little about the qualities of objects which stimulate our sense organs? Sensations are physical objects; however, there are many physical objects which are not human sensations; since the physicist and the chemist know very little about the qualities of physical objects which are not human sensations, these persons use some human sensations in their scientific observations, and usually believe that it is part of the work of the psychologist to study the qualities of human sensations. The statement that a sensation having a quality is caused to exist in a mind by an object which stimulates one of the sense organs helps to suggest more precisely what I mean by a sensation. What I mean by a sensation is an abstraction to the extent that the sensation does not include in its being the metaphysical stuff which was the cause of the sensation. Frequent use of the word "quality" has been made in this paragraph. This word has more than one specialized meaning. For example, if you are asked about the quality of a proposition in logic, you tell whether the proposition is affirmative or negative; this is one of the specialized meanings which I wish to avoid when defining a sensation. The statement that the quality of an elementary sensation can be used to distinguish the sensation from any other sensation having a different quality but having the same duration, intensity, and extent if there is any extent helps to suggest more precisely the specialized meaning which I want to give to the word "quality" in the expression "quality of sensation." Red, sweet, cold, etc., are examples of qualities of sensations. The qualities of visual sensations are thought by most of mankind to be qualities of external objects. The expression "sensible qualities" is defined to mean the expression "qualities of sensations." A human sensation is an event which exists in the mind of a person and is made of quality, duration, intensity, and extent if there is any extent; no other metaphysical stuff is a part of the make-up of the sensation. A red sensation which exists in my mind during one second of time and which has an intensity and a bulk is an example of a sensation. It is possible that a comparison of a sensation which exists momentarily in my mind with one of my memories of an event which took place in my mind may make my definition of sensation more precise. On the one hand, unless I assume that I have the ability to remember, all my knowledge is not reliable; on the other hand, my knowledge of the metaphysical stuff without which my memory would be impossible is very incomplete. Each sensation that exists in my mind is an abstraction of such a nature that my knowledge of my sensations is my most perfect knowledge. My knowledge of

the sensations in my mind is more perfect than my knowledge of the sensations of other people. Since other human biological organisms resemble very accurately my body, it is assumed that their sensations resemble very accurately my sensations and that other human beings can know in general what I mean by sensations; however, none of my sensations can be a sensation of another human organism.

*Memory and duration.* I am not a professional musician; perhaps this explains why, when I am singing, or playing a mandolin, a piano, or a violin, or hearing music of other performers, my attention sometimes goes from the musical sensations to other things of greater interest. Sometimes I am conscious of this change of attention; probably there are times when I am not conscious of the change of attention. Suppose that a sensation having a duration of approximately one second was a part of my mind; also consider the hypothesis that this sensation was not one sensation but many sensations each of which had a duration of much less than one second; if this hypothesis is true, it was impossible for me to be conscious of each one of the sensations of very small duration, because of the defects of my consciousness and of my attention; there is no good reason to say that this hypothesis is not good. Suppose that I have just finished singing the melody "America." I can now remember that I used the monotonous sounds of my metronome to help me keep the time as correctly as possible, that each one of the consecutive notes of the melody had a definite duration, that the durations of the notes were not equal in all cases, and that the durations of the notes were not monotonous. It seems to me that there is in this musical experiment nothing which necessitates that I had any direct knowledge of the durations of the musical sensations. In other words, it is better to assume that I have the ability to remember, and it is better to deduce my knowledge of the durations of my sensations from my ability to remember.

*Perception and imagination.* A perception is a sensation and a consciousness that the sensation is a map of another physical object which caused the sensation by stimulating the peripheral part of a sense organ. A sensation does not have to be visual in order to be regarded as a map of another physical object; any sensation which performs the function of a map of another physical object can be regarded as a map of the physical object. Under the general term "sense organ," we may include not only the peripheral organ on which the stimulus acts, but also the cortical center by means of which sensations are directly aroused, and also the sensory path through which the impulses are conveyed to the cortical center. Suppose I am observing an object which in ordi-

nary language is called a red box. In this case, a red sensation is a part of my perception of the box; the red sensation is caused by the light which the physicist talks about being reflected from the red box to my eyes, which are parts of the sense organ which causes the red sensation. It seems to me that the word "red" in the foregoing sentence is used in a very ambiguous manner; the expression "red box" means that the box is of such a nature that the box causes a red sensation to become a part of my mind; in other words, the word "red" in the expression "red box" does not mean the same as the word "red" in the expression "red sensation." Since it is assumed that the red sensation and the red box are two distinct objects, there is no reason why the red sensation can not have a duration which is in the neighborhood of one second and why the red box can not have a duration of several years. Perceptions are more than sensations. An imagination is a sensation and a consciousness that the sensation is not caused by a stimulus acting on the peripheral part of a sense organ and is caused by a brain excitation.

If I try to solve a problem in mathematics, sensations are a part of the process of writing the symbols, of looking at them, and of talking to myself about them. This is an illustration of the following general proposition: sensations are always parts of acts of reasoning; however, these acts contain metaphysical stuff which is not the familiar human sensations.

A good knowledge of human biological psychology should greatly help us to understand the nature of physical objects.

*Kinds of physical objects.* In general, we attempt to distinguish the various human sense organs by the differences in the sensations which they cause. Within the limits of the sensations which can be caused by one sense organ, there may be subqualities. For example, the sensations of vision have many different qualities. The acting stimulus of the peripheral part of a sense organ may be at the exterior of the body or at the interior of the body. While many of our sensations are so distinct in quality that we can recognize them without difficulty, others are of a more obscure quality. In addition to our sensations of vision, hearing, smell, taste, pressure, and temperature, there are doubtless many other sensations less distinct in quality; such, for instance, are the sensations caused by the muscles and by many of the visceral organs. Since the qualities of some human sensations differ very much from the qualities of other human sensations, it is probable that there are sensations which are not human and which differ very much from any of the human sensations. It may be that a knowledge of some sensations which are not human would greatly in-

crease our knowledge of the nature of physical objects. As our knowledge of human biology, heredity, and surgery increases, man may learn to perform experiments so that some kinds of sensations which are now not kinds of human sensations will become kinds of human sensations. Since some parts of a human mind are not human sensations, a philosopher could argue that some physical objects are so unlike human sensations that these physical objects ought not to be called sensations. On the other hand, since human knowledge of human sensations is the most perfect human knowledge, a philosopher could argue that all parts of the mind of a god are sensations; otherwise the god would not be a god; from this point of view, a philosopher could argue that all physical objects are sensations. The proposition that some physical objects are not sensations is significant, not because we can prove the proposition is true or false, but because there is a possibility that the proposition is true.

James in his book on *Pragmatism* states the following. "Berkeley's criticism of 'matter' was absolutely pragmatistic. Matter is known as our sensations of colour, figure, hardness and the like. They are the cash-value of the term." Since James wrote that "It is impossible rigorously to define sensation," it is a waste of time to try to prove that Berkeley's criticism was true or false without a rigorous definition of sensation. I would like to make the following assumptions and then examine Berkeley's criticism: my definition of human sensation is rigorous; my definition is presupposed; when James used the word "sensations," he meant human sensations. Suppose I look at a distant forest; this causes a human sensation to become a part of my mind. I can regard this sensation as being a map of human sensations which individual trees will cause to become a part of my mind if I shall go to the forest, look at the individual trees, and put my hands on them. To regard the forest and the trees as being such human sensations is not consistent with a satisfactory theory of physical objects. A tree may cause an animal to have a sensation which is very different from any human sensation. A god might perceive the tree in such a way that the tree would cause the god to have a sensation very different from any human sensation. Sensations which are not human and simple types of mental physical objects perhaps exist inside the tree. The theory of this inquiry is consistent with the existence of all the different kinds of physical objects. Berkeley was interested in proving that matter can not exist, because he held that the belief in matter leads to atheism; he contributed nothing except confusion to the understanding of physical objects.

*Sensations and astronomical objects.* Assume that I look at a

star so far away that its distance from my eyes can be conveniently stated in light years. It is evident that the amount of time I have to wait after starting to look at the star before the appearance of the sensation can be conveniently measured by seconds of time or by a fraction of a second. The sensation should be located somewhere. It seems more reasonable to locate the sensation either in my mind or where the star is than at any other place. If I assume that the sensation is located where the star is, I must explain how my mind can cause the sensation to occur where the star is so quickly after I start looking at the star; in other words, to assume that my human sensation happens where the star is is more absurd than to assume that the earth is the center of the universe and that the celestial sphere containing the heavenly bodies makes a diurnal revolution around an axis which passes through the center of the earth. The theory that all my sensations occur in my brain is as important in the field of psychology as the Copernican revolution in the field of astronomy.

Although the theory of this inquiry is a combination of epistemological dualism and of physical monism, this theory is not dogmatic about the nature of the physical world. This theory asserts that human minds are physical objects. According to this theory, all physical objects may be minds or parts of minds or parts of one mind, or some physical objects may not be sensations or may not contain any mental physical objects. One philosopher might believe a philosophy very much like the philosophy in *The World and the Individual* by Professor Royce, and might also believe the theory of this inquiry; another philosopher might be an atheist and a materialist, and might also believe the theory of this inquiry; between these two extremes, other philosophers might believe different types of philosophy, and might also believe the theory of this inquiry.

JOHN L. ROBERTS

BRUNSWICK, MAINE

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## BOOK NOTES

*The Bill of Social Rights.* GEORGES GURVITCH. New York: International Universities Press. 1946. 152 pp. $2.00.

Professor Gurvitch proposes a Bill of Social Rights for inclusion into the constitutions of contemporary national states. The specific rights enumerated include many of the provisions of model constitutions proposed in recent years and bear a close surface resem-

blance to those incorporated in the proposed French Constitution defeated last year. Only a few of the rights enumerated go beyond any foreseeable possibility of enactment or beyond present technical resources for their realization. Such, for example, are the unrestricted right to emigrate or immigrate, that is, the right to join or to withdraw at will from any political unit, and the right to a happy childhood. The rights discussed fall into three major groupings: those that accrue to the individual as a part of a group—the rights of man as worker, as citizen, as consumer, and as property owner; those that belong to the group as a group—rights of labor unions, coöperatives, and the like; those that accrue to the individual, not as a member of a particular group but simply as a person—primarily rights protecting the individual from domination from any particular group and rights designed to give the individual a positive basis for the realization of his highest potentialities.

The distinctive character and the cutting edge of Professor Gurvitch's proposals are revealed less in the specific rights enumerated than in their organizing principle and in the social ideal that underlies and informs them. Here all similarity between the French Constitution and Professor Gurvitch's proposals ends. Despite the many provisions in the French Constitution designed to protect the individual from the state, it was essentially paternalistic and monistic in its perspective. In contrast, Professor Gurvitch's approach is radically pluralistic. Most of the book is devoted to a defense of pluralism as an empirical reality, as a needed technique for combatting the growing Leviathan, and as a social ideal. Naturally enough, the focus of his position is to be found in his treatment of the relation of law to society.

Professor Gurvitch argues that social law, as distinguished from the legal system of a political order, expresses the organization and structure of autonomous groups and collectivities (blocs of groups) that emerge spontaneously and independently of the state legal system. Though recognized and incorporated into the legal system, social law does not depend on the state for its validity. The primary and determining factors of social processes is the existence of independent and interdependent groups with their own self-generated jural norms and consequent claims and rights. They are the "autonomous centers of jural regulation" amidst which the legal and political order of the state is and should remain "a small island in the vast ocean of autonomous jural orders."

The underlying assumption of most treatments of rights, especially of those economic and social rights which we desire to secure for individuals and groups, is that we must look to the state

for the creation and protection of new social rights. "Social" law is thought of as law enacted by the state to protect the weaker elements of society (family, children, consumer, etc.) and to organize state intervention in the economic sphere in the interest of planning. Such a conception is, in the opinion of Professor Gurvitch, part and parcel of a monistic conception of law and makes of individuals and groups merely passive beneficiaries of the all inclusive state. The concrete implementation of this attitude in practice is totalitarianism.

Statism in practice is, in Professor Gurvitch's opinion, the most serious evil of western culture, and the purpose underlying his bill of rights is to so frame these rights that they may serve as instruments to counteract the contemporary drift toward the monopolistic state. His bill of social rights serves this end by extending the principle of checks and balances from the domain of the political to the sphere of the economic and by encouraging the development of autonomous and democratically controlled economic organizations which, while centralized, will none the less remain free as a whole from political authority and will as a minimum operate as a check upon political power.

It is perhaps unfair to the intent of Professor Gurvitch but in estimating the worth of his proposals one can not help but feel that he makes the fatal assumption that political power is one thing and economic power another and that the two can remain independent of one another. The power to decide what shall be produced, how it shall be produced, and how it shall be distributed is indistinguishable in its effects from political power. Whether we call it the one or the other makes little difference in its operative effects. To work for the formal autonomy of political and economic institutions seems to beg the real question which is how to preserve individual and group freedom and yet secure the needs of security through the instrumentalities of a planning economy which seems to demand high centralization and therefore concentration of power. The modified and deepened syndicalistic approach which Professor Gurvitch takes has much to offer in the way of specific devices for maintaining autonomy of local groups and of individuals within these groups. It is not at all clear that we have more than a formal reconciliation in the overall picture however. Our basic social dilemma remains: centralization of planning and control is necessary for the well-being of nations; this means the possession of a high degree of power; and power may always be used for good or for evil.

E. N. G.

***Man against Myth.*** BARROWS DUNHAM. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1947. xv + 320 pp. $2.50.

This is explicitly a book about social superstitions; Dr. Dunham is the man, certain social superstitions are the myth of the title. The "myths" chosen for analysis are "that you can't change human nature," "that the rich are fit and the poor unfit," "that there are superior and inferior races," "that there are two sides to every question," "that thinking makes it so," "that you cannot mix art and politics," "that you have to look out for yourself," "that all problems are merely verbal," "that words will never hurt me," and "that you cannot be free and safe." To the extent that it fulfills its aim of examining these popular fallacies logically, this is a worthwhile book.

Unfortunately, Dr. Dunham slides into apologetics for Marxist doctrine, and thus negates whatever of value there is in the ostensible aim of the book. This is not an impartial critical examination of myths, but a justification of one set of myths by a *reductio ad absurdum* of others. The book might serve well the purposes of teachers of courses in critical thinking; having followed Dunham's criticisms, students would be able to turn their guns against Dunham's implied views, and thus to get double value at one price.

J. L. B.

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## CURRENT JOURNALS

JOURNAL OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC. Volume 12, Number 2. On absolute properties of relations: *Andrzej Mostowski.* The problem of interpreting modal logic: *W. V. Quine.*

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. Vol. XXIV, No. 3. Cambridge Approach to Philosophy (II): *S. S. Orr.* Eighteenth Century Writers on Twentieth Century Subjects: *A. N. Prior.* Hume's Treatment of Identity: *J. C. Maxwell.*

THE PERSONALIST. Summer 1947. (Bowne Centenary Number.) "This Thing Called Personalism": *R. T. Flewelling.* Bowne in American Ethical Progress: *F. J. McConnell.* Bowne in American Theological Education: *A. C. Knudson.* Bowne: Eternalist or Temporalist: *E. S. Brightman.* Bowne in the Classroom: *J. T. Carlyon.* Whitman's Poem of Personalism: *W. A. Huggard.* Personalism as a Form of Explanation: *F. G. Ensley.* Belles Lettres: 1830–1930: *William van Wyck.* Current Thought: *D. S. Robinson.*

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG. Band I, Heft 1. Leibniz und wir. Zum 300. Geburtstag des Philosophen: *Kurt Huber*. Das Modalitaten-problem: *Walter Bröcker*. Numen und Ethos: *Willy Hellpach*. Gottlob Frege als Philosoph: *P. F. Linke*. Zum Problem der philosophischen Grundlehre: *Rudolf Zocher*. Was können wir von der Philosophie der Inder lernen?: *Helmuth von Glasenapp*. Die Lage der Aristotelesforschung: *Paul Wilpert*.

DIALECTICA. Vol. I, No. 2. Connaissance objective et connaissance poétique: *F. et J. P. Gonseth*. Les notions d'objectivité et de subjectivité en physique atomique: *P. Destouches-Février*. Essai sur les notions d'ouverture et de fermeture: *F. Fiala*. Dialectique de l'objectif et du subjectif dans les arts plastiques: *R. Hainard*. Zum Begriff der Dialektik: *P. Bernays*.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LOUVAIN. Tome 44, No. 4. Problèmes épistémologiques fondamentaux: *Fernand Van Steenberghen*. Nouvelles questions de Siger de Brabant sur la Physique d'Aristote: *Anneliese Maier*. Le "Théorème de la connaissance" de M. Jacques Paliard: *Henri Lacroix*. La perception de la causalité selon M. Michotte van den Berck: *Jean Paulus*. Deux ouvrages récents sur Aristote: *Gérard Verbeke*. (A list of doctoral dissertations presented at the Institut Superieur de Philosophie de Louvain, since October, 1939). (No. 5.) Le problème philosophique de l'existence de Dieu: *Fernand Van Steenberghen*. Doute et croyance: *Roger Verneaux*. Qu'est-ce que le comportement? *Gérard de Montpellier*. Note complémentaire sur les méthodes de déduction naturelle: *Robert Feys*. (Supplément Répertoire Bibliographique.).

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCHOLASTICA, Anno XXXIX, Fasc. 1. Guglielmo di Moerbeke traduttore della Poetica di Aristotele: *Minio-Paluello*. Il problema dell'essere come persona: *V. Porcarelli*. La definizione della realtà: *F. Olgiati*.

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## NOTES AND NEWS

A special announcement has been sent to members of the American Philosophical Association informing them of the general program which is being planned for the Second Inter-American Congress of Philosophy which will be held at Columbia University, December 28–31, 1947. The announcement indicates that sessions in which representatives of North American and Ibero-America will participate will be devoted to the following general topics: Theory of Knowledge, Oriental Philosophy and Religion, Metaphysics, Es-

thetics and Philosophy of Art, Philosophical Anthropology, Philosophy of History, and Logic. Later announcements will be made as the program takes more definite shape. Those who wish to communicate with the Program Committee may address one of the following: Professor Cornelius Krusé, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut; Professor Roger W. Holmes, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Massachusetts; Professor George F. Thomas, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.; or Professor Donald C. Williams, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Chairman of the Program Committee of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association.

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Dr. Georgi Schischkoff, editor of *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung,* notifies us that a group of philosophers in the American Zone in Germany, most of whom are contributors to the *Zeitschrift,* are organizing a philosophical conference at Garmisch-Partenkirchen in Bavaria some time in September 1947. American participation in this conference is solicited by this group and any American philosophers who may be able to attend are asked to notify Dr. Schischkoff as soon as possible. Communications should be addressed to him at Schlehdorf am Kochelsee (Oberbayern), Germany.

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The *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* changed its name to the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* beginning with 1947, in order that it may not be confused with the new *Australian Journal of Psychology.* The name of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy remains unchanged. Mr. J. A. Passmore of Sydney University will be the new editor, succeeding Professor John Anderson, who has been the editor since 1935.

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Announcement is made of the National and International Fellowships for 1948–1949 granted by the American Association of University Women for research or graduate study by women students. For detailed information, address the Secretary, Committee on Fellowship Awards, American Association of University Women, 1634 I Street, N. W., Washington 6, D. C.

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Theodore Brameld, of the University of Minnesota, has been appointed Professor of Philosophy of Education in the New York University School of Education.

Professor Abraham Edel of City College, New York, will be Visiting Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, during 1947–1948.

Arthur Pap, of the University of Chicago, will be Visiting Lecturer at City College, New York, for the year 1947–1948.

Professor Karl Schmidt, professor emeritus of Carlton College, will be Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University during the spring semester of 1948.

We regret to learn of the death of Léon Robin, Professeur Honoraire at the Sorbonne and president of L'Institute International de Philosophie, in Paris, July 9, 1947, at the age of 81.